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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Introduction to the Problem
This paper has not attempted to make any contribution
to the legal profession; it is rather an attempt on the part
of a layman to present in so far as is possible, without in
dulging in dangerous interpretation, a general background of
the problem of school liability for injuries to pupils in
the State of Montana,
If the law were a static and unchangeable institution
there would perhaps be no need of lay people wading through
much extraneous information in an attempt to evaluate their
respective relationships in a legal situation, and the entire
problem of tort liability in a particular state might be
summed up comparatively briefly.
The law, however, is in a constant state of flux.
New laws are passed by legislatures; new interpretations are
rendered by the courts; and opinions by prominent jurists,
lawyers, and attorney generals frequently influence legis
lators and other attorneys.

Therefore, this paper will be

limited to that information which may be of interest and
—

1—
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importance to school people, not with the view that they may,
in the event of a lawsuit against them, be prompted to act as
their own counsel, but rather with the thought in mind that
with some background regarding their legal obligations they
may be better prepared to avoid situations which may render
them liable to a suit for damages.
In 1950, over twelve thousand cases, which were
brought against schools, cost an aggregate sum of approxi
mately seven million dollars^.

This figure alone should be

significant evidence to school board members, administrators
and teachers that the problem is real, that it affects
school finances, and as will be discussed later, it has its
implications for school policy.
The problem is not only important to school people,
but has presented situations troublesome to the courts and
taxpayers alike.

Perhaps the main issue involved can be

classified as a moral one.

For example, to what extent

should boards of education be responsible for pupils, maimed,
injured or killed?

As the situation stands at the present

time, it is frequently the only body capable financially
of compensating parents or pupils for any loss.

There is an

old adage that you cannot squeeze blood from a stone.

Is it

then feasible to bring suit against a school teacher whose
income makes the satisfaction of any judgment an impossibil
ity?

Certainly this has been true in the past.

There is no

^Robert Hamilton, ^^Law for Schoolmen” , Time Magazine,
(May 21, 1951).
------ ^ -----
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-3way of ascertaining how many potential suits against teachers
for negligence have never reached the courts, because of the
futility of suing someone who does not have the money.

On

the other hand, if for the sake of discussion, school boards
were stripped of their immunity and held liable as a body for
the negligence of teachers, and administrators, two questions
are left to be answered.

First of all, would there be an un

duly large number of suits brought against the public schools
merely because public funds would be available to satisfy a
judgment?

Secondly, would such an imposed liability affect

the quality and caliber of men seeking positions as trustees?
In most states, a local board member's job is an honorary one,
and does not carry with it any financial compensation in the
form of salary or expenses.

Would it then be just to hold

members of a community financially liable when engaged in a
service to a community for which they receive no financial
benefit?

At the same time, who is to say that a child or its

parents should not

be compensated for the loss of sight of a

child, a permanent

injury, or even a medical billfor a

temporary injury if that injury was in any way the result of
unreasonable conduct on the part of schools or school per
sonnel?
With the schools of our nation, and Montana no excep
tion, being responsible for an increasing number of pupils,
with new educational plants and policies underway, schools
have in effect become "big business".
not only enjoy the

As big business, they

responsibility, but must sharethe
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-4obligations, not because of the financial magnitude of edu
cational institutions alone but more so because of the in
creasing scope of educational activities.

Definitions of Legal Terras
To understand the problem and its implications, it
is necessary and to a great extent appropriate to confine
research to professional and legal sources.

In doing so, the

layman finds himself confronted with a vocabulary and termi
nology peculiar to the legal profession but needful of defi
nition to those whose work in other fields rarely if ever
brings them in contact with these terms.
First of all, what is meant by the term tort?

A

tort according to Prosser^ is:
. . . . a term applied to a miscellaneous and
more or less unconnected group of civil wrongs,
other than breach of contract, for which a
court of laIV will afford a remedy in the form
of an action for damages. The law of torts is
concerned with the compensation of losses
suffered by private individuals in their
legally protected interests through conduct of
others which is regarded as socially unreason
able.
Many definitions of the term tort can be supplied,
for example, a tort may be defined as:
. . . . a legal wrong committed upon the person
or property independent of contract.2 or
^William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts,
(West Publishing Co., 1941).
2
Blackls Law Dictionary (3rd ed.; West Publishing Co.,
1933).
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-5. . . . the infraction of some public duty, bv
which special damage accrues to the individual.
The same authority cited above has also defined a
tort as:
, . . . the violation of some private obligation
by which like damage accrues to the individual.2
This study has been concerned with a particular kind
of tort, that which involved an injury to the person, and
might be properlv classified as being a personal tort as
distinguished from one involving damage to real or personal
property.3
If a tort then can be committed through the conduct
of others, which is regarded as socially unreasonable, the
next logical question would be what constitutes socially
unreasonable conduct, how is it so defined in legal terms?
The most common form of conduct which courts and
legislators have generally recognized and defined as being
socially unreasonable is negligence.

Negligence has been

defined by the Montana courts, among many others as:
. . . . the want of care which an ordinary
prudent and careful man would exercise under
given circumstances.4
According to Prosser^, certain elements are necessary

^Black, o£. cit., I, 4.
^Ibid., p. 4.
^Ibid.. p. 4.
^Birsch v. Citizens Electric Col, 36 Mont. 574,

93 fac. 940 (1903).
^Prosser, o£, cit., I, 4.
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-6to render one liable on the basis of negligence.
A.

They are;

A legal duty to conform to a standard
of conduct for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks.

B.

A failure to conform to the standard.

C.

A reasonably close causal connection be
tween the conduct and the resulting injury.

D.

Actual loss or damage resulting to the
interests of another.

Another term which is frequently encountered in law
suits involving negligence is contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the person
suffering damages which falls below the standard to which he
is required to conform for his own protection.
willbar recovery

Such conduct

only if it has exposed the damaged party

to the particular risk from which he suffers harm.^

Contrib

utory negligence therefore, may prevent recovery against a
negligent party.
Another bar to recovery is stated in legal terras as
the assumption of risk. which is the implied or express
consent on the part of the damaged party to relieve the de
fendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take
2
his chances of harm from a particular risk.
Generally speaking, there are four classifications
of damages which a court may award for the injury or death
of minors due to negligence:

^Prosser, 0£. cit.. I, 4 ,
^Ibid., p. 4 .
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A.

A court may award nominal damages.
Nominal damages generally amount to a small
sum where there is no substantial loss or
injury, but the law recognizes there has
been a technical invasion of the plaintiff’s
right or a breach of defendant’s duty.l

B.

Compensatory damages (this is probably
the most frequently encountered of damages
awarded in successful suits for personal in
jury due to negligence) are such as will re
imburse the injured party for the injury
only, and will simply make good or replace
the loss caused by the wrong or injury.^

C.

Exemplary damages are damages awarded over
and above compensatory damages wherever the
wrong or injury was committed under circum
stances of violence, opposition, malice, fraud,
or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of
the defendant. These are frequently referred
to as punitive or punitory damages.3

D.

Prospective damages, are compensatory damages
for that damage which is expected to follow
from the act or negligence of the defendant.
Things which must necessarily or most probably
will result from the injury.^

Sources of Legal Authority
Before undertaking a study of cases in a particular
legal field such as this, it may be well to reviev/ briefly
the various sources of legal authority on the state level.
First, the State Constitution supersedes all other
State laws.

The Supreme Court of the State interprets the

State Constitution whenever the need arises in the form of
^Black, o£. cit., I, 4 .
^Ibid.. p. 4,
^Ibid.. p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 5 .
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-8test cases, and therefore the Supreme Court has a definite
influence in interpreting the meanings of the constitution
in its relation to laws passed by the legislature.
The second source may be found in the statutes, or
laws passed by the state legislature.

These in turn and in

theory supersede court decisions or the common law.
The next level of authority may be found in decisions
of the various levels of courts in the various states.

These

proceedings when compiled and evaluated have established cer
tain legal principles and precedents which constitute what is
known as the common law.

(The term common law may be correct

ly applied in reference to the English common law which has
a very great influence on our oim courts in the absence of
American decisions pertinent to the subject.)
A decision in one state having similar statutory
regulations does not necessarily have to be followed by the
courts of another state, but it must be remembered that prec
edent has long been one of the most influential factors in
legal decisions, and the decisions in one state therefore are
frequently not without influence on the decisions of another.
On the other hand, it is possible that a supreme court of a
state may at a later date reverse its position or revise its
interpretation of a legal situation.

The dicta of cases of

courts of record may often give clues as to the disposition
of a particular court which may eventually attempt to remedy
a situation by reversing a prior decision.
These dicta are not without their influence on legis-
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labors v^o, in agreement with the courts reasoning, may in
stigate remedial legislation.
In the actual conduct of a trial itself, it becomes
the duty of a judge to rule on matters of law while a jury
weighs the evidence to determine questions of fact.

It is

therefore not the jury's duty to determine what negligence
is, but rather upon instructions from the judge to determine
from the evidence presented in court whether a situation or
fact occurred or did not occur.

Summary of the Problem
In summary then, the problem is one of determining
the areas of possible liability on the part of Montana school
officials and employees for pupil injury.

V/ith an increasing

number of lawsuits being brought against public schools, and
with the public schools increasing in size of enrollments and
in the scope of their activities, this becomes a problem of
vital importance to school people, whether board members,
administrators or teachers.
To understand the problem, certain terms have been
defined which are frequently encountered in the law on this
subject, the understanding of which is a necessary legal
background to the problem.

In addition to this terminology

may be added the three larger classifications of legal
authority within this State, constitutional, statutory, and
the common law as it is revealed by court decisions.
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legal terms have been used in the body of this work in ad
dition to those defined here; whenever they have been used
and it was thought that a definition was needed, it has been
supplied*
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CHAPTER II
SOURCES OF INFORMTION
In preparing this paper it became apparent that five
main sources of information were available:
A.

Work already done in this field or
in related fields in other Universities
in the forms of doctoral dissertations,
masters' theses or published books;

B.

Specific legal references such as
statutory provisions of the United States,
court decisions, and legal dictionaries,
texts and annotated reference books;

C.

The opinions of lawyers and school
administrators ;

D.

Facts gathered from parents and pupils
involved in situations involving injuries
connected with the school system;

E.

Hearsay evidence, regarding cases
which were never brought to court, or if
brought to court never reached a court of
record.

-

11-
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Doctoral Dissertations
As to the first category, a listing of doctoral
dissertations^ from the year 1937 to the present time was
examined.
In 1941 , it was found that three such studies were
made on the doctoral level.

The first one was a doctoral

dissertation by John Cavicchia at Rutgers entitled The Law
of Tort as Applied to Public Schools . At the same time at
New York University, Charles Francis Xavier O ’Brien wrote on
The Legal Status of Corporal Punishment in Public School
Systems of the United States^.

(Due to the fact that this

was only a related problem to the study at hand, and that
statutory provisions in the State of Montana are rather ex
plicit as to corporal punishment, O ’Brien’s work was not ex
amined.)
Also, in I94 I; Arthur C. Poe at Columbia University
had published his doctoral dissertation on School Liability
for Injuries to Pupils4.

This work takes the form of a hand-

^Association of Research Libraries, Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities (H7 W. Wilson Co.,

1941/42-1950/51).
p
John Cavicchia, "The Law of Tort as Applied to Public
Schools" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers, 1941).
^Charles Francis Xavier O ’Brien, "The Legal Status of
Corporal Punishment in Public School Systems of the United
States" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. New York University,
1941 ).
^Arthur C. Poe, School Liability for Injuries to ?upils (published Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1941).
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-13book for school administrators, dealing largely with explan
ations of the legal principles involved.

While Poe points

out distinctions between states, the information is not di
rected toward school people in any one particular juris
diction.

His bibliography and listing of cases, while by no

means exhaustive, makes interesting and informative reading.
In 1940 , Harry Nathan Rosenfield published, in coop
eration with New York University School of Law, a doctoral
dissertation on the Liability for School Accidents^.
Rosenfield’s work is enhanced, no doubt, by his most appro
priate background to undertake a writing in this field.

He

was Secretary to the Commissioner, Board of Education, New
York City, New York, and also an Instructor in School Law,
School of Education, New York University, and a member of
the New York Bar.
Rosenfield*8 work is somewhat longer than Poe's but
more limited in its definition of legal terras.

The organiza

tion of his work becomes extremely valuable to school admin
istrators by virtue of the fact that he has classified in
juries to pupils as to their physical location.

For example,

one chapter deals with accidents on the playground, another
with school safety patrols, another with accidents involved
in the transportation of students.

His work also includes

an index of cases by states.
^Harry Nathan Rosenfield, Liability for School Accidents (published Ph.D. dissertation in cooperation 'with New
York University School of Law, New York University, 1943).
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“l/f
in 1943, Marie Marguerite Schwartz at the University
of Wisconsin wrote on The Law and the Teacher^.
In 1943 , two more studies on a doctoral level were
made, one by Herman P. liantell at New York University, con
cerning The Liability of Teachers and School Officers in New
2
York State . About the same time, at George Peabody College
for Teachers, Robert Ward Johnston wrote on The Legal Aspects
of Insuring Public School Property^ .
Between 1943 and 194&, there is no evidence of any
work on the doctoral level being done on this particular
problem.

However, in 1949, at Chicago, Fred E. Brooks did

some work on The Legal Status of the Pupil in the American
Public Schools^. At the same time, at Temple University,
Ted J. Satterfield wrote on The Legal Aspects of a Tort
Liability in School Districts as Indicated by Recent Court
Decisions^.

Satterfield has done subsequent work published

^Marie Marguerite Schwartz, "The Law and the Teacher"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin,
1943).
^Herman P. Mantell, "The Liability of Teachers and
School Officers in New York State" (unpublished Ph.D. dis
sertation, New York University, 1943).
^Robert Ward Johnston, "The Legal Aspects of In
suring Public School Property" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta
tion, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1943).
^Fred E. Brooks, "The Legal Status of the Pupil in
the American Public Schools" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
University of Chicago, 1949).
^Ted J. Satterfield, "The Legal Aspects of Tort
Liability in School Districts as Indicated by Recent Court_
Decisions" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University,
1949).
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in the Phi Delta Kappan^. in which he strongly advocates
doing away with the iiiiraunity as regards school districts.
At the present time, Satterfield is Professor of Education,
State Teachers College, Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania,
At Harvard University in 1950, Ernest E. Fuller wrote
on Tort Liability of School Districts in

United States^,

Another work done in 1950, exclusive of Satterfield’s, was by
Freeburg at Indiana^,
Probably the most interesting work being currently
undertaken is a series of pamphlets published by Dean
Hamilton of the University of Wyoming College of Law,

These

pamphlets^ deal with a great many aspects of school law, and
are written in a style which is understandable to the layman,
and particularly interesting because of Hamilton’s willing
ness to interpret the implications of case holdings to school
administrators,

Legal Sources
The specific legal references used included as backIphi Delta Kappan (Phi Delta Kappa Fraternity, 19501951), ^ o Y T 3 T :
^Ernest E. Fuller, "Tort Liability of School Districts
in the United States" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University, 1950).
^William H. Freeburg,"The Law and Liability of
iMunicipal, Charitable and Private Corporations for Conducting
Aecreation Camps" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Indiana, 1950).
^R. R. Hamilton, Bi-Weekly School Law Letter,
(University of Wyoming, College of Law, 1951).
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ground reading pertinent sections of Ruling Case Law^,
Corpus Juris^, Corpus Juris Secondum^, American Law Reports^,
American Jurisprudence^, Black's Law Dictionary^, and
Prosser on Torts?.
In addition to these, state constitutions, and in
particular the State Constitution of the State of Lontana,
and the Revised Codes of the State of Montana, 1947^ were
consulted before engaging in the subsequent search for
specific cases.
The case references cited in this work were largely
derived from Pacific and Montana Digest^, Montana Reports^^,
and the Fifth Decennial^^.

Naturally, there are citations

of cases of other jurisdictions than those of the Northwest
^Ruling Case Law (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co.,
1914).
2
Corpus Juris (American Lawbook Company 192S),
^Corpus Juris Secondum (American Lawbook Co., 1941).
^American Law Reports (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing
Co., n.d. )•
^American Jurisprudence (Lawyers Cooperative
Publishing Co., 1943).
6rBlack, 2 2 . cit.. I, 4.
7
'Prosser, o£. cit.. I, 4.
8.
Revised Codes of the State of Montana, 1947
(Annotated) (Allen Smith Company, 1949).
^Pacific and Montana Digest (VJest Publishing Co.,1941)
^^Montana Reports (State Publishing Co., pub. yrly.).
l^Fifth Decennial (West Publishing Co., 1948).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-17states cited.

Wherever the secondary source of authority

was a reputable one, the abstract was taken from the second
ary source verbatim, and both secondary and primary sources
have been cited wherever possible.

Other Sources
The third general source of information, that of
opinions of lawyers and school administrators, has been of
assistance in directing the course of research and guiding
the delimitation of the problem, but has not been used
directly as reference material or cited as such in this
paper.
The fourth category, facts gathered from parents and
pupils, has not been considered as a reliable one, mainly
because of two factors.

The passage of time of course fre

quently clouds an issue, particularly as to the actual facts
or sequence of events.

Another objection would be the rather

obvious conclusion that people involved, either as parents of
injured pupils, or pupils themselves, could not reasonably be
expected to view their own injury objectively.
The last category, that of hearsay evidence, obvious
ly has no place in research of any kind.

It is merely

mentioned because such information is frequently offered by
wellwishers and can "if taken to heart" color the conclusions
drawn from actual research.
In summary then, it can be said that the last three
categories of sources were observed, at times appreciated.
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but seldom if ever used to constitute evidence of the status
of school liability in Montana or in any other jurisdiction.
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CHAPTER III
GENERAL BACKGROUND OF SCHOOL LIABILITY

How the Common Law is Applied
The common law, that great mass of court holdings
and legal principles handed down by courts and judges both
in England and the United States, has set up certain prin
ciples of law which are followed by courts in this country,
in the absence of any statute changing the law.
If a cases arises concerning the tort liability of a
school district, the court of any state would first examine
the state laws (statutes) to find out if there was any par
ticular law on the tort liability of school districts.

If,

upon examination, no statutory provisions are found perti
nent to the case at hand, the court then examines the cases
on the same subject which have arisen within the state.

The

legal reasoning, the opinions and the decisions set forth by
these cases, establish a precedent for any conclusion the
court draws, assuming the same points of law are involved.
Suppose, however, the court finds no statutory provisions and
no cases within its own state on which to rely?

The court

then examines cases from other states having similar laws
and uses these cases as precedent.

There is no law which

-19"
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says any court must follow precedent, but tradition makes
such practice so common that it is taken to be a probabil
ity.
When attempting to determine the common law back
ground or "case law background" in regards to tort liability
of school districts for pupil injury in Montana, it is nec
essary to refer to cases from other states.

Frequently, in

matters of law, the Montana courts have looked to California
decisions because of the similarity between California Codes
and Montana Codes.

This similarity, however, does not apply

to tort liability of school districts since California has a
lavr^ which specifically has changed the common law position,
while Montana has no such law.
The court of any state then looks first to its ovm
statutes, next to its own cases, then to the cases of other
states having similar laws, or no laws superseding the com
mon law doctrine,

Common Law Doctrines Pertaining
to School Districts
In an effort to determine what the common law is in
respect to school districts, it is first necessary to ascer
tain the relationship existing between the school district
and the state.

Some states have referred to school districts

^California School Code, Section 2, pp. S01-S02.
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“

as quasi municipal corporations, and public corporations or
involuntary corporations.

Regardless of wording, American

courts are usually agreed with the sentiments of the Indiana
court when it defined a school district in the following
language;

"A school district under our system of government

is merely an agency of the state".^

The courts then are

agreed that a school district is an agent of the state gov
ernment, and as an agent of that government, while acting
within the bounds of its authority, enjoys certain priv
ileges and immunities along with the state, which have their
roots deep in the history of common law.
The idea that a state may not be sued without its
consent is a "hand-me-down" from the ancient medieval maxim
of "the king can do no wrong", meaning the state of course.
When this definition of a school district and this common
law doctrine of immunity of suit are joined, the result
generally is that a school district may not be held liable
for the torts of its agent, in the absence of an express
statute to the contrary.

Notice that there are several

qualifications to this rule of immunity from suit.

In the

United States, this doctrine has not been applied to school
districts in cases involving contract law, and has been fur
ther qualified by many courts so that it pertains to immuni
ty in cases of negligence but not in cases involving active
misconduct.

An inconsistency seems apparent when one

Ipreel v. Crawfordsville, 41 N.E. 312, 142 Ind. 27.
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-22considers this line of reasoning.

First of all, if the

courts have held that this immunity from suit does not apply
in cases involving the law of contracts, but that it does
apply to cases involving negligence, one might well pose the
question, "Why does the law afford protection to a mature
individual having a contract with a school board or school
system for services or goods delivered, in which the only
probable loss would be of property or money, while the same
law holds that a small child or his parents may not be af
forded that protection if they suffer physical injury or even
death?"
In England, where our "common law" originated, school
boards are at present liable for their torts^, but American
courts generally uphold the traditional viewpoint, albeit
with an increasing number of dissenting opinions and rum
blings of dissatisfaction^.
There are other grounds upon which the courts base
this non-liability of school districts for the negligence of
their employees.
3
V. Trask :

The Montana court has outlined in Perkins

Even the school board itself cannot render
the district liable in tort, for when it commits
a wrong or tort, it does not in that respect
represent the district. Various reasons are
assigned vdiy a school district should not be
^Harold J. Laski, "The Responsibility of the State in
England", Harvard Law Review, 32;— 1919.
Hamilton, o£. cit.. II, 1$.
^Perkins v. Trask, 95 Mont. 1, 23 P. (2d) 9^2 (1933).
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on the ground that the relation of master and
servant does not exist; others take the ground
that the law provides no funds to meet such
claim. Still other authorities hold that
school districts in performing the duties re
quired of them exercise merely a public function
and agency for the public good, for which they
receive no private or corporate benefit. Many
authorities do not base their holding on any
single ground, but rely on two or more of them
at the same time.
This decision has been borne out by subsequent cases.^
In the above quotation, the Montana court makes reference in
its mention of a *public function", one of the important
distinctions made by many courts in determining liability of
school districts.

If in the course of their activities, a

school board, in its corporate capacity performs what the
courts consider a governmental function. the general rule of
immunity applies.
Physical training has been held by the Montana Courts
as being a governmental function .

Other activities which

courts have declared to be governmental are the maintenance
or employment of transportation for pupils to and from
school^, and the charging of the lay public to see an athletic
event^.
^Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Volk, 74 N.E.
646 , (1905 ); also. Schornack v. School District, 266 N.v;. I4 I,
64 S.D. 215 (I936 ).

^Bartell v. School District 28, Lake County, 137 P.
(2d) 4 2 2 , (1943).
^Poe, op . c_i^., II) 12.

^Rhoades v. School District 9, Roosevelt County,
142 P. (2d) 890 , 115 Mont. 352 , (1945).
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If on the other hand, the court finds a school district or
school board, acting in its corporate capacity, has been
negligent, in the performance of a proprietary or ’’private”
function, the rule of immunity does not apply to the school
district, and it may be liable as any other corporation.

The

theory is that when such a group as a school board engages in
a private function not authorized by the state, it has
exceeded the authority vested in it by the state, and in doing
so has put itself beyond the protection of the state.
The following cases are representative of the deci
sions rendered in those states which rely on the common law
doctrine of immunity, on one ground or another, and have no
statutory provisions altering it.
In Alabama, the county board of education was held
not liable for injuries caused to a child by a negligent bus
driver on the school grounds.^
In Colorado, a case against the school district was
dismissed on the grounds of district immunity wherein a pu
pil was injured by a heavy radiator which was standing on a
sidewalk adjoining the school.

Apparently, the pupil, in

the course of play, pulled the radiator over on himself and
2
as a result his leg was broken.

^Turk

V.

County Board of Education of Konroe County,

131 So. 436, 222 Ala. 177, (1930).
V.

^School district 1 in City and County of Denver et al
jvenney, 236 Pac. 1012, 77 Colo. 429, (1925)•
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A long list of cases could be compiled demonstrating the
immunity of school districts, but since this paper is con
cerned with the Montana law, and since the general rule is
so well established, the noting of a large number of cases
in detail seems hardly necessary, particularly since the
Montana cases cited later in this work in detail bear out the
general rule without exception.
A rather interesting exception has appeared in a few
jurisdictions relying on the common law in regards to a par
ticular type of negligence known as nuisance.

According to

Rosenfield^, "A nuisance consists in the existence or crea
tion of a situation which by its very nature is likely to
cause injury, harm, or inconvenience to another".

A hypo

thetical example might be a situation in which a school dis
trict maintained a large open well on the playground, where
the physical position of the well and the nature of its con
struction was obviously dangerous to children, and yet by
virtue of its position children were exposed to it.

This

nuisance doctrine, according to Rosenfield^, was first
stated by the Michigan court in 1899^, and again in 1937 by
the Connecticut court^.

^Rosenfield, o£. cit., II, 13, p. 31.
^Ibid.. p. 25.
Ferris v. Board of Education of Detroit, 122 Mich.
3 1 5 , 81 h.W. 98, (1899).
^Bush

V.

City

of

Norwalk, 122 Conn. 426, 189 At. 608,

(1937).
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-26Even more recently, in 1951, the Kansas Court^ has
stated it in the following terms:
A school district, being a quasi public
corporation, has no more right to create and
maintain a situation that is a nuisance to
private individuals than does a municipal cor
poration.
Rosenfield concluded in 1940 that the states were
divided on the issue of school district liability under the
nuisance doctrine.

Not only were they divided, but, in his

opinion, inconsistent frequently within their own jurisdic
tions as to what was negligence and what was a nuisance.^
Some of the most understandable statements clarifying the
distinction between negligence and nuisance were rendered
by Justice Cordozo in McFarlane v, Niagara Falls^,

Cordozo

states, "Narrow is the line between nuisance and negligence".
In the course of the decision, he points out that the word
nuisance is a "catchall" term, and that some nuisances are
based on negligence while others are not.

An example of a

nuisance not based on negligence, according to Cordozo, would
be the case of the individual whose factory emits noxious
fumes even though he has taken every precaution to prevent
it.

As an example of a nuisance which has its basis in

negligence, he cites the situation where a coal hole was

^Neiman v. Common School District No. 95, Butler
County, 232 P. (2d) 422, 1?1 Kan. 237 (1951).
2

Rosenfield, 0£. cit., II, 12.

^McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N.E,
391, (1909).
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built under proper license but the individual building the
coal hole was negligent in not having it properly covered,
hence the situation becomes a nuisance based on negligence.
Cordozo also points out in this case that:

"Whenever a

nuisance has its origin in negligence one may not avoid the
consequences of his oivn contributory negligence by affixing
to the wrongdoer the label of a nuisance".
The latter example is probably of more importance to
school officials, since most situations arising around school
grounds which would be of a dangerous nature would probably
tend to fall into the category of cases where the nuisance
is based upon negligence.

This decision is not necessarily

the law in Montana, but it is significant in that it repre
sents the legal opinion of a prominent American jurist,
whose legal reasoning is respected and not infrequently
followed by the courts throughout the United States,

Liability of School Board
Members as Individuals
As has been pointed out, the law has clothed school
districts and school boards, while acting in their official
capacity, with immunity for their own negligence or for the
negligence of their employees.

However, if a school board

member, functioning as an individual and not as a part of
that board, is guilty of conduct which the courts deem negli
gent, he is then liable as any other individual.

For example,
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if a school board member were to take some students to a
football game in his car, and in the course of the trip drove
his car in a negligent manner which resulted in an accident,
and some pupils were injured, he would be liable for negli
gence as would any other individual*
The Indiana courts held the members of a school board
individually liable wherein the plaintiff, not a pupil, was
injured by the collapse of poorly constructed bleachers dur
ing a field day exhibition conducted by the school board.^
The courts held that when the board undertook the construc
tion of the bleachers the function was not a ’’governmental”
one in which the board members were engaged but a "minis
terial” one.

This Indiana case is confusing because of its

inference that a governmental function is opposed to the
concept of a ministerial function.

Usually, the terms minis

terial or discretionary functions are associated with the law
concerning municipal corporations, and are applicable to
school board members as individuals acting as individuals,
while the terms governmental and proprietary are usually
associated with the school board as a corporate body.

There

have been no cases as yet in Montana in which a school offi
cial has been charged with negligence in the performance of a
ministerial duty, probably because it is difficult to conceive
of any ministerial duty which a school board member is re
quired to perform that could lead to pupil injury,

A minis

terial duty has been defined as a specific and positive duty
^Adams v. Schneider, et al, 123 ü.E. 713,(1919).
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Some legal authorities hold that a public official
regardless of whether his duties are ministerial or dis
cretionary should be liable if he acts in bad faith.^
Although this may be the better view, Montana courts have
stated it differently.
In 1912 , the Montana court made the following statements regarding the tort liability of public officials.

3

If the official duty is public no private
redress is available . . . .
If the act of the official involved discretion
or is quasi judicial no civil liability attaches
as long as it is within the scope of the official's
authority . . . .
Only when official acts are purely ministerial
is the official liable to individuals for mis
feasance or non-feasance in the exercise of his
office . . . .
Poe^ mentions, that many states have statutes which
specifically exempt members of the board, as individuals,
from personal liability in cases involving personal injury
to pupils in public schools.

This is no doubt provided by

some states as a matter of public policy so that responsible
citizens would not be reluctant to accept a position as a
board member, for fear of subjecting themselves to a series
of lawsuits.
^Montana Law Review. VIII (Law School Association,
lontana State University, Missoula, ilontana, 1944), P- 97.
2
Restatement of the Law of Torts. para. 265 .
^Smith

V.

Zimmer, 45 Mont. 282, 125 Pac. 420, (1912).

^Poe, 0£. cit., II, 12, p. 59 .
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which admits of liability of school board members, qualifies
itself to the extent that a school board member shall be
liable if the negligence on the part of the said member is
the proximate cause of such injury or death^.

The court then

has said, that if a board member’s act is the direct cause of
the injury, liability exists.
Now the question arises as to the liability of board
members, as individuals, for the negligence of their employ
ees, which would include administrators, teachers, janitors,
and all other employees under contract with the school board.
There is another doctrine in common law known as respondeat
superior.

This doctrine hinges around the conception of a

master servant relationship, and that the master should pay
for the negligent acts of his servant.

Most courts have

held that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply
to school board member-employee relationships, on the ground
that administrators, teachers and other employees are not the
personal employees of the board member ,

Generally speaking

then, in most jurisdictions, where there is no statute to
the contrary, school board members are not liable for the
negligent acts of their employees, and this is true in the
State of Montana.
^School Code of the State of California, 0£, cit.,
III, 19, Sec. 2, p. 507.
^Mitchell

V,

Hartman, 112 Cal, App. 370, 297 Pac. 77,

(1931).
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Liability of Administrators, Teachers,
and Other Employees
With only one exception^, no doctrine of immunity
from suit has ever been applied to teachers, administrators
or employees of school districts.

They stand, in the eyes

of the law, as any other individual, and the only possible
immunity which they may enjoy may be by virtue of statutory
provisions relating to corporal punishment.

Most states

have specifically stated in their laws the privileges and
limitations to v^iich a teacher or school administrator is
subject regarding disciplinary measures and corporal punish
ment .
The Montana statute regarding corporal punishment is
2
typical, and is quoted here in its entirety :
1031. Corporal punishment. V/henever it
shall be deemed necessary to inflict corporal
punishment on any student in the public schools,
such punishment shall be inflicted without un
due anger and only in the presence of teacher
and principal if there be one, and then only
after notice to the parent or guardian; except
that in cases of open and flagrant defiance of
the teacher or the authority of the school,
corporal punishment may be inflicted by the
teacher or principal without such notice.
While the above law does, in a sense, allow teachers

^Poe, o£. cit.. II, 12, p. 67.
^School Laws of the State of Montana, 1949 (Tribune
Printing and Supply Co., Great Falls, Montana, 1949), Chap.
101, Sec. 1031.
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to commit a technical assault, it is further limited by the
following section^:
1084 . Undue punishment of pupils. Any
teacher who shall maltreat or abuse any pupil
by administering any undue or severe punish
ment shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction thereof before any court
of competent jurisdiction, shall be fined in
any sura not exceeding one hundred dollars.

Returning to the general rule, the following cases
may be

of interest to school teachers or principals who are

underany illusions as to whether the

doctrine of district

immunity attaches itself to them.
In California, a teacher who permitted pupils to use
a dilapidated truck which belonged to the school, without
warning or instruction as to its operation, was held liable
for negligence when the truck went off the road on a curve
and injured one of the pupils^.
Another California case, in 1935, involved a high
school chemistry experiment.

During the experiment, students

were engaged in making explosives.

There was an explosion,

and one of the students was injured.

The court held the teach

er liable, on the ground that such an experiment should have
been carried on under the strictest attention of the instruc
tor,^

^Ibid., Chap. 101, Sec. IO8 4 ,
2

Woodman v. Hemet Union High School District of Riverside County, 29 P. (2d) 257, 135 Cal, App, 544, (1934).
^liastrangelo v. West Side Union High School District
of iierced County, 42 P. (2d) 634 , (1935),
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“33In New York, a teacher was held liable for failure
to properly supervise the playground during noon hour, .*en
a pupil was injured on a fire escape.
was her delegated job.

Noon hour supervision

The facts of the case disclosed that

she watched the playground through a window which afforded
no view of the fire escape^.
Another New York case, which should be of interest
to the physical education instructors, occurred in 1947.

In

this case, a physical education instructor was held liable
by the courts for letting two boys box, without training in
self defense or warning of the danger involved.

One of the

boys suffered a hemorrhage as a result of a blow^.
The courts of Iowa at one time provided an exception
in their interpretation of the common law to the generally
established principle of non-immunity from suit of teachers^.
Rosenfield points out, that this attempt on the part of the
Iowa court4- to extend the immunity of school districts to
their employees was shortlived, and subsequently changed by
later opinions of the same court^,
^Miller v. Board of Education, Union Free High School
District of New York, 50 N.E, (2d) 529, 291 N.Y. 25.
^LaValley v. Stanford, ?0 HYS (2d) 460, (1947).
^Poe, 0£. cit., 11, 12, p. 67 .
^Hibbs V. Independent School District, 213 Iowa 341,
251 N.W. 606, (1933).
Shirkey v. Keokuk County, 225 Iowa 1159, 275 N.V/.
7 0 6 , (1938).
5i'.iontanik v. Kcmillin, 225 Iowa 422, 230 N.V/. 603,
(1938).
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“34The general rule of liability then regarding teachers,
administrators and employees of school districts is that they
must conduct themselves in a reasonably prudent manner, or
answer for the consequences of their negligent acts.

Summary
It has been stated that the common law, as evidenced
by the opinions of judges and case decisions, has created
certain broad principles of law which have a profound in
fluence on cases which might arise in the future.

In determin

ing what the law is, the court looks first to the statutes of
its own state, next to the decisions of its own courts, and
then to the decisions of the courts of other states having
similar laws.

These common law doctrines were first discussed

as they pertained to school districts as a corporate body.
The general rule of common law being that a school district,
as an agent of the state, is immune from suits for its own
negligence or the negligence of its employees.
tions to this were pointed out.

Certain excep

The distinction, which is

probably of primary importance to ilontana, being that of
immunity of the district in the performance of a governmental
or "public" function, and non-immunity if the activity under
consideration is of a proprietary or "private" nature.
It has been pointed out, that school board members,
acting as individuals, in any state not having a statutory
provision

abrogating the common law, are liable for their
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This includes the State of Montana.

The law of tort in regards to teachers, (^.vhich term
generally includes administrators and principals) and janitors,
is much the same as it is for any private citizen or individ
ual.
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CHAPTER IV
THE HONIARA POSITION REGARDING
PUPIL INJURY

Key Montana Cases
In the last twenty six years, the Montana Supreme
Court has had occasion to render four decisions pertaining
to the tort liability of school districts.

The four cases

are cited at length in this chapter because they represent
the only cases decided by the Montana Courts regarding the
tort liability of schools.
The first case ivas Mills v. Stewart^.

The facts of

the case stated briefly as follows, taken from the opinion
of Mr. Justice Holloway %ho delivered the opinion for the
Montana Court, are:
. . . . George A. Rietz, a resident of Lewis
and Clark county, was injured while a student
at the state university at Missoula. He con
tends that on the day he registered (September
2 5 , 1923 )) he was assigned a room on the second
floor of the "South Hall" dormitory building;
that he was not familiar with the surroundings;
that on the same floor and near ni 3 room were
two doors about two feet apart, one of vdiich
led into the bathroom and the other into the
^Hills

V.

Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332,

(I926).
-

36-
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-37elevator shaft; that neither door was
locked, and neither one was marked or
labeled, and there was not anything to
indicate which door led into the bath
room or which one led into the elevator
shaft; that the hall v/as dimly lighted, and
when he undertook to go to the bath-room,
through mistake he opened the door leading
into the elevator shaft, and, the shaft being
unguarded and the elevator above that floor at
the time, he fell down the shaft to the bottom
of the pit and sustained serious, permanent
injuries, on account of which he incurred large
expenses, only a part of v/hich has been repaid
to him; a part of such expenses was paid by the
university.
These matters having been brought to the
attention of the members of the Nineteenth
Legislative Assembly, an Act was passed and
approved (House Bill 39^, Laws of 1925, p. 416),
which in a preamble sets forth the substance of
Rietz’ contention. The Act then provides that
if Rietz presents a claim to the state board of
examiners within three months after the approval
of the Act, the board shall hear and determine
the claim, and if it shall find that the injuries
were sustained as contended by Rietz, damages
therefor in such amount, not exceeding $7 ,500 , as
the board shall determine to be just and equitable,
”shall constitute a legal and valid claim against
the state of Montana.” The Act then makes an
appropriation of ÿy7 ,500 , or so much thereof as may
be necessary to pay the claim, if it is allowed by
the board.
Rietz made due presentation of his claim, and
the board appointed a time for hearing; but before
final action was had this, suit was instituted by
a resident taxpayer to secure an injunction
restraining the board from proceeding further
with the .latter. From an order granting the
injunction the board appealed.
The complaint in the action proceeds upon the
theory that House Bill 39^ is unconstitutional,
and in consequence thereof any action taken by the
board must be void. This theory was adopted by
the trial court, and the correctness of it is the
sole question presented by the appeal.
. . . . The dormitory building is the property
of the state, and the state is charged with its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

—38management and control, and, while it does not
have any moral right to commit a tortious act,
it has the same capacity to do so as any other
corporation. (1 Cooley on Torts, p. 208; Bishop
on Noncontract Law, sec. 749.) The maxim of
the English law '^The King can do no wrong,” does
not find a place in the jurisprudence of this
country. (Langford v. United otates, 101 U. 3.
341, 25 L. Ed. 1010.) The state, like any other
corporation, can act only through agents, and
if the state of Montana were a private corporation,
it would be responsible to Rietz in an action at
law for the damages resulting proximately from
the negligence of its agent in charge of the dor
mitory building. But the state is a public
corporation, and out of considerations of public
policy the doctrine of respondeat superior does
not apply to it unless assumed voluntarily'. In
other words, the state is not liable for the
negligent acts of its agents unless through the
legislative department of government it assumes
such liability.
The main problem in this case then was not of deter
mining the liability of school districts or of the negli
gence of the state or its agents, but of specifically deter
mining the constitutionality of a private bill passed by the
Montana State Legislature to reimburse the plaintiff.
The case is interesting because of the method used
to obtain reimbursement for injuries to a pupil, which was
through the legislature rather than through courts of law.
This "private bill" method has been employed at various
times in other states with some success.

Nhile the legis

lature of the State of Montana is not bound by tradition and
precedent to the extent that courts are, they have certainly
imposed upon themselves a moral obligation to provide reim
bursement to pupils injured in the public schools.

This

contention is based upon Justice Holloway’s reasoning in
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-39declaring that this bill was constitutional because the money
expended or appropriated for the plaintiff was deemed to be
for a "public purpose".
this instance.

The public purpose was education in

T-Iore of Justice Holloway’s opinion follows;

. . . . It is elementary that a state cannot
be sued without its consent or be compelled
against its will to discharge any obligation.
. . . . If the term "legal claim" as applied to
a state has any meaning it must refer to a claim
vdnich is recognized or authorized by the law of
the state, or one which might be enforced in an
action at law if the state were a private corpo
ration, and this is in the sense in which the
terra was employed in State ex rel. Mills v, Dixon,
and apparently it was used in the same sense Tn
Conlin v. Board.
The question then arises: Was it within the
power of the legislature to give recognition to
the Rietz claim by assuming a limited liability
for the negligence, if any, of the state’s agent?
Our legislative assembly acts in virtue of
inherent authority and not through authority
delegated to it . . . . , and since it is not
prohibited by the state Constitution or by the
supreme law of the land to assume liability for
the torts of the state’s agents, it may do so.
In 26 R. C. C. 66 , it is said: "The power of the
legislature to make the state or one of its sub
divisions liable for injuries inflicted by it
upon an individual is unquestioned even if there
was no liability at comiûon law."
Reitz has a valid claim against the agent
through whose negligence he was injured, and if,
in advance of the injury the state had, by general
law, assumed liability for the negligence of its
agents in charge of the university buildings
there would not be any dissent in the authorities
from the conclusion that an appropriation to dis
charge such liability would be for a public purpose.
kVe do not discover any provision of our
Constitution which forbids the legislature to
assume liability for injury resulting from the
negligence of the state’s agent, whether the
liability is assumed before or after the injury
occurs, and to say that the state may assume such
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liability but may not discharge it is simply
to make the law ridiculous.
The Montana court then, in this case, has stated the
general rule of immunity from suit of the state.

The court

has held that the legislature of the state may assume that
liability either by an enacting a statute making them liable,
or by private bill reimbursing a particular individual.
The next Montana case which upholds the general rule
is that of Perkins v. Trask^.

This case is quoted in its

entirety except for case citations made by the court in its
opinion.
. . . . This is an action for damages for the
death of James Penkake, plaintiff's minor son.
The complaint seeks recovery against school dis
trict No. 1, of Powell county and against the
named defendants as trustees and individually,
and is grounded upon negligence. The trial court
sustained a general demurrer to the complaint, and,
deeming the complaint one that could not be
amended to state a cause of action against any of
the defendants, entered judgment that plaintiff
take nothing by her action. The appeal is from
the judgment.
The sole question presented is whether the
complaint states facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against the defendants, or any
of them. Plaintiff in her complaint, after
alleging that she is the mother of James H.
Penkake, charges defendants with negligence
resulting in his death. The particular negli
gence relied upon is set out in detail, and may
be summarized as follows: That the defendants
maintained and operated a swiiriraing pool in school
district No. 1 for the general use of the pupils;
that, owing to certain facts specifically alleged,
the pool was a dangerous place in which to permit
children to play and swim ; that they were permitted
and directed so to do without having any one in
charge to guard them; and that in consequence,
Iperkins v. Trask et al, 23 P. (2d) 9^2 (1933).
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while James H. Penkake, then a pupil, was
playing in the pool, and by reason jf the
negligence of the defendants, he lost his
life by drowning.
It is sufficient to say that the allegations
of negligence are ample to state a cause of
action if a school district or its trustees,
either as trustees or individually, may be
compelled to respond in damages for negligence;
hence the question is directly presented as to
whether a school district or its officers are
liable for negligence.
The general rule, sustained by the over
whelming weight of authority, is that school
districts are not liable in damages for injuries
caused by the negligence of their officers, agents,
or employees, unless the liability is imposed by
statute. The courts are not generally in accord
as to the reason for such nonliability. Some base
it upon one reason, and some upon another. Th^
general rule is stated in 24 R. C. L. p. 6O4 , as
follows : "The courts very generally hold that
school districts are not liable in damages for
injuries caused by the negligence of their
officers, agents or employees, nor for any torts
whatsoever, unless such liability is imposed by
statute, either in express terms as is the case
in some jurisdictions, or by implication, as
where the district is given authority to levy
taxes to meet such claims. But of course this
general rule of law is limited to the district
itself, and does not extend to independent
agencies doing work for the district on school
property. Even the school board itself cannot
render the district liable in tort, for when it
commits a wrong or tort, it does not in that
respect represent the district. Various reasons
are assigned why a school district should not be
liable in tort. Some authorities place it on the
ground that the relation of master and servant does
not exist; others take the ground that the lav;
provides no funds to meet such claims. Still other
authorities hold that school districts in per
forming the duties required of them, exercise
merely a public function and agency for the public
good, for which they receive no private or corporate
benefit. Many authorities do not base their
holdings on any single ground, but rely on tvra or
more of them at the same time.
....

Plaint iff»s counsel contend that this
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by the great weight of authority for several
reasons:
First. It is argued that, because of
section 1022, Revised Codes of 1921, which
provides that "every school district constituted
and formed as provided in this title shall be and
is hereby declared to be a body corporate, and
under its own proper name or number as such
corporate body may sue and be sued, contract and
be contracted with, and may acquire, purchase,
and hold and use personal or real property for
school purposes mentioned in this title, and sell
and dispose of the same," there is legislative
authority to sue a school district in tort. The
adjudicated cases hold that such a statute does
not have this effect........
Second. Plaintiff's counsel contend that
under the laws of this state defendants had no
authority to construct or maintain a swimming
pool, and hence cannot defend on the ground that
they were but performing governmental functions.
Our Constitution imposes the duty upon the
Legislative Assembly "to establish and maintain
a general, uniform and thorough system of public,
free, common schools." Section 1, art. 11. This
the Legislature has done by the enactment of our
school laws. The courses of study are prescribed
by section 1054, Revised Codes of 1921, with
power in the boards of trustees "to determine
what branches, if any, in addition to those re
quired by law, shall be taught in any school in
the district." Chapter 122, Laws 1923, and
chapter 122, Laws 1931. Also by chapter 1A7,
Laws 1927 , the trustees are given authority to
issue bonds for the purpose of constructing or
acquiring a gymnasium and for "furnishing and
equipping the saii.e." (Section 1.) Under the
broad rules announced in ilcNair v. School District
87 .'lont. 423 , 288 P. 188, 69 A.L.R. 866, the
trustees have authority to construct and maintain
a swiroraing pool for the use of the pupils.
It is also contended by plaintiff that, if
there be authority to maintain a swimming pool,
the authority does not extend to the right to
maintain a dangerous instrumentality, such as the
one is alleged to be in this case, and that in
consequence there is no immunity from liabilitv on
the ground that its maintenance constituted a part
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-43of the governmental functions of the school
district. This contention overlooks the fact
that in all cases holding that there is no
liability on the part of the district or its
officers for negligence there is no statutory
authority for the maintenance of the offending
agency in a negligent manner.
It is also contended that, if the board has
the right to maintain a swimming pool, its right
is optional and not mandatory, and hence the rule
of immunity does not apply. This fact does not
alter the legal principle applicable. Krueger v.
Board of Education, supra.
Other contentions made by counsel for
plaintiff as to the liability of the school
district and the trustees, as such, have been
considered by us, and we see no reason for de
parting from the rule sustained by the overwhelming
weight of authority.
The only remaining question is: Are the
individual defendants personally liable? . . . .
But in most of the cited cases the injury or
damage was caused by the failure to perform a
statutory duty. Here there is no statute
directing how a swimming pool shall be maintained.
The complaint does not charge a failure to
perform a statutory duty. The other cases deal
with ministerial, as distinguished from govern
mental, duties, and hence are not controlling here.
Perkins v. Trask then has summed up the various
grounds upon v^ich the general rule of immunity applies.

It

has also declared that the existence of a statute in Montana
stating that a school district may sue and be sued does not
alter the common law position as regards to tort liability.
The court pointed out the distinction between government and
proprietary functions and relies heavily on this line of
reasoning as the basis for school board immunity.

It also

infers that school board members might be liable for neg
ligent performance of a ministerial duty, and that they would
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-44be liable for negligent conduct if engaged in a proprietary
function.
The next case is Bartell v. School District ho, 23,
L^ke C o u n t y The facts of the case and the opinion as
stated

in the words of the court are as follows :
. . . . The complaint is for damages for
negligence. It alleged in part that plaintiff
was a pupil and defendant Bronson the principal
of the school mentioned; that Bronson, within
the scope of his employment as such and while
coaching and instructing several older boys of
the school in the field event of shot putting,
directed plaintiff to stand near where the heavy
iron shot would fall and to mark the place; that
Bronson, without warning to plaintiff, cast the
shot, striking plaintiff on the head and
inflicting serious injuries of a permanent nature.
. . . . In accordance with the well established
rule * it has been held by this court in Perkins v.
Trask, 95 Mont. 1, 23 P. 2d 9^2, that school dis
tricts are not in general liable for injuries
caused by negligence of their officers, agents
or employees unless liability is imposed by
statute ; even though the activity with which the
negligence is connected is optional with the
school district.
Plaintiff’s contention is set forth as follows
in his brief: "We do concede that the general
rule is that a school district is not liable in
tort, but this case falls within the list or line
of exceptions. The rule is that a school district,
town or city as well as a county, is not liable
for tort when the tort is committed while acting
in a governmental capacity.
"The rule laid down in the case of Perkins v.
Trask - *
has no application and is not controlling
in the case at bar, nor do the many citations
mentioned therein throw any light on this case.
The facts and conditions are materially different.
In the Trask case there was inaction while per
forming a governmental function in the absence of

^Bartell v. Bchool District No. 23, Lake County, 137
P. (2d) 422, (1943).
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-45specific statutory instruction. Here there is
positive action, in fact an overt act, placing
a child in a dangerous place vdiile he was not a
part of the athletic team, when by force of rule
and authority he had to obey, failing to advise
him of the accompanying danger, and failure to
warn him whenthe professor threw the ball, and,
we claim, in violation of a statute which requires
a cautious lookout for the welfare of a child, and
in the presence of statutes giving the school
board power to levy taxes for athletic purposes.
And no one can, with any degree of credence, say
these acts as above listed are governmental functions,
"If this boy had been part of the athletic
team and chose to perform the duties he did
perform of his oivn volition or even by request
and then was injured, we concede there would be
no liability and, under those circumstances, the
rule of the Trask case would apply."
W a i l e plaintiff states that there are various
exceptions to the rule of non-liability, the
exceptions upon vdnich he relies here are shown by
the distinction he draws between the circumstances
of the Trask case and the instance one. The
contention seems to be that because plaintiff was
not voluntarily receiving instructions as a
member of the athletic team (1) the defendant
school district was not acting in a governmental
function and (2) the injury resulted from
plaintiff’s being put into a dangerous place by
"positive action, in fact an overt act" rather
than by mere negligence or non-action. That these
are the only grounds upon which he relies is sho\‘jn
by his final admission quoted above. He speaks
also in this reference to "a statute vAiich requires
a cautious lookout for the welfare of a child" and
"statutes giving the school board power to levy
taxes for athletic purposes." whatever the school
district’s duties and powers lay be in those
respects are not shovn to be any different under
the circumstances of this case from what they were
in the Trask case, in which the accident occurred
in connection with a swimming pool instead of an
athletic field.

It does not appear how, in the athletic
activity in question here, the district was
acting in any less a governmental function than
in the Trask case. It is unquestioned that
physical training is part of the educational duty
entrusted to the public schools, i.chair v. School
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District Ko. 1, S? Mont. 423, 2SÛ P. 183,
69 A.L.R. 866, V/e find no authority for the
proposition that these educational duties are
limited to the members of voluntary athletic
teams, and can imagine no serious argument
which could be made to that effect. Plaintiff’s
reference to that phase of the matter in the
final sentence quoted above from his brief must
therefore have been intended to relate to the
proposition that he was there by positive order
of the principal rather than by his own volition
and that the proximate cause of the accident va.s
therefore the principal’s affirmative action
rather than his mere negligence. It will not be
necessary to consider '/vhether the order placing
him in that position was the proximate cause of
the injury.
For the proposition that the district is
liable if the injury is caused by an affirm
ative action rather than by mere negligence of
its employees, plaintiff relies only upon the
following statement from 24 R.C.L. 605, Sec, 6O;
"The authorities generally recognize that this
rule of exemption from responsibility, as broadly
stated, does not extend to positive mischief
produced by active misconduct, or direct acts in
the nature of a trespass which invade the premises
of another to his injury,"
Obviously there is great difference between
the "affirmative act" of the principal in asking
plaintiff to mark the place where the shot was t'^
fall and the "active misconduct" referred to in
the textbook statement. The only case cited by
Ruling Case Law is Daniels v. Board of Education,
191 Mich. 339, I5Ô N.W. 2 3 , L.R.A.1916P, 468 , from
which the statement vra.s quoted; but that case merely
held that under its facts there was no liability,
so that it can hardly be considered a precedent
for either of the propositions stated. The court
cited as an authority only an earlier Michigan
case relating to the second proposition, that of
trespass upon another’s premises, and not to the
first proposition of "active misconduct." The
rule further more, in so far as it may be good,
apparently relates to action by the district
authorities and not to the unauthorized actions
of its mere employees or agents.
Thus the rules are stated (56 C.J. 530, lection
622) that a district is not liable for the negligence
of its officers, agents or employees except where
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made so by statute, and (56 C.J. $26, Section
621 ) that the district is not liable for its
ovmi negligence in the absence of statute, except
under some circumstances "for a trespass upon
private property committed in the improper exer
cise of its lawful functions." It will be
noted that no such exception is stated in connection
with the question of a district's liability for
negligence of its officers, agents or employees
as distinct from its own negligence.
It is our conclusion that the present case
is not within any exception to the general rule.
'Æether that rule should be changed, as has been
done with reference to certain circumstances by
the legislatures of California, Washington,
Oregon and other states, is a matter for the
legislature rather than the courts.
Again the Montana Court has made the distinction of
governmental versus proprietary function, and defined physical
training as constituting a governmental function of the
school district.

It has pointed out that there may be some

exception to the general rule for trespass committed in
improper exercise of lawful functions, but the opinion
rendered in the Trask case was upheld.
The next case, that of Rhoades v. School District
No,

is important for again the governmental - proprietary

distinction is relied on, but more important perhaps because
of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Erickson,

The

majority opinion of the court was delivered by the Honorable
Frank P, helper, which is as follows:
. . . . Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries
alleged to have been suffered by her as a result
of an accident which occurred in the school
gymnasium at Poplar, Montana. The defendants,
iRhoades v. School District Mo, 9 , 142 P, (2d) 690,
115 Mont. 352, (1943).
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appeared by general demurrers which were
sustained. Plaintiff was granted time in which
to file an amended complaint. Having failed to
plead further, plaintiff’s default was entered
and judgment of dismissal followed. This
appeal is from that judgment.
The sole question presented is — Does the
complaint state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against the school district
or against the other defendants as trustees or
against them as individuals or against any of
them? All of the allegations of the complaint,
which are well pleaded, stand admitted. We
therefore have these admitted facts:
That the defendant district is one of the
duly constituted school districts of Roosevelt
County, Ilontana, The other defendants are the
duly elected, qualified, and acting trustees of
that district.
The building in which the accident occurred
is a school gymnasium. It was constructed and
is maintained by this school district and is
upon school grounds.
At the time alleged in the complaint there
was a basket ball game or contest between the
neighboring school teams of Brockton and Poplar.
The general public in that vicinity were advised
of the time and place of this game through
advertisements. Plaintiff attended that contest.
She paid admission.
Within the gymnasium is a floor space suitable
for playing the game of basket ball and other
games. Within the gymnasium and above the space
provided for playing basket ball is a gallery for
the accommodation of spectators. Leading to
that gallery is a stairway. As the plaintiff
approached the gallery by way of this stairway
one of the stairs collapsed or gave way and
she received the injuries complained of. She
alleges the construction was faulty and that the
stairway was not properly maintained.
So far as material, these are the essential
admitted facts.
It must be conceded that the allegations of
negligence contained in the complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action if
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the school district or its board of trustees,
either as such or individually, are liable in
damages for negligence.
This court has heretofore passed upon this
precise question in the case of Perkins v. Trask,
95 I-iont. 1, 23 Pac. (2d) 9#2, 953, and there used
the following language:
"The general rule, sustained by the over
whelming weight of authority, i s ........ '»
. . . . Counsel for plaintiff concede that
the foregoing is the general rule but contend that
this court, as well as other courts, have mod
ified the rule in that a distinction has been
drawn between a governmental instrumentality such
as a county, city or school district when acting
in a governmental capacity as distinguished from
a proprietary capacity; and that, in the instant
case, the school district and its officers were
acting in the latter capacity; that is, in a
proprietary as distinguished from a governmental
capacity. In support of that contention counsel
cite a number of adjudicated cases, among which
are . . . .
In none of these cases, or in any of the
others to which the court's attention has been
called, is there any modification of the rule that
no liability attaches v^ere the instrumentality
such as a county, city, or a school district is
acting solely in a governmental capacity. A
careful analysis of the allegations of the
complaint here compels the conclusion that the
defendants were acting in this instance in that
capacity— that is, in a governmental capacity,
A public school system is provided for in our
Constitution (section 1, Article XI). The trustees
of a school district may issue bonds for the
purpose of constructing a gymnasium (Chapter 147,
Laws of 1927 , sec. 1224.1, Rev. Codes of 1935).
The evolution of our common school system is
most interesting and that system has contributed
no little to the development and stability of
this nation, v.'e have come to regard education—
not as a development of a part of the faculties,
but of all of them— the intellectual, the moral,
as well as the physical, (i^t. Herman Boys' School
V. Gill, 145 mass. 139, 146, 13 H.E. 354, 3 5 7 7 1 In
order to make effective our conclusions in that
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respect we have authorized the proper officers
of a school district to expend our ;r.oney in
the construction of a gymnasium, A part of
that physical training consists in the playing
of games— basket ball among others. Because
some are better able to coordinate the action
of the different members of the body, they are
more adept at playing games than are others ; but
with basket ball, as in all other games, practice
makes perfect.
It is a matter of common knowledge that, in
these schools, teams are selected to play against
another team or teams of the same school; and
that out of all of these are selected those who
have acquired the greatest proficiency, and these
compose the team which represents the school in
contests with teams from other schools in the
same general vicinity. In striving to make the
first team there is a great rivalry, A spirit of
emulation is developed— all of which results in a
more complete development of uhe physical powers,
Undoubtedly, one of the elements which stimulate
the contestants is that they will be afforded an
opportunity of exhibiting their skill in games
against their fellows of the same school or
against teams of a different school. This, we
think, is true, not alone as it pertains to
physical sports, but the same may be said of
debating teams, or of band concerts, or of
exhibitions of the art department of a school.
The fact that a band concert is held, or an
exhibition of the work of those in the art
department of the school had, brings better results
in each of these departments. Therefore, we
conclude that the basket ball game in question
was merely a part of the program of physical
education of the school; and consequently, the
defendants were exercising governmental functions
in connection therewith.
Counsel for plaintiff emphasize the fact that
an admission fee was charged and assert that because
such charge was made, the activity is removed from
the field of governmental functions. With that we
cannot agree. Little if any difference does it
make whether the admission fee thus collected
went into the school fund, or whether the expense
of conducting this game of basket ball was paid
from general taxation. The result is the same. It
advances the purpose of physical education. That
is a part of the governmental functions of the
school district and of its trustees........
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I'le reaffirm the rule announced in the case
of Perkins v. Trask, supra,

Neither are the members of the board
individually liable; this for the reasons set
forth in the Perkins case,
The dissenting opinion on the above case of Justice
Erickson is important to luontana, because it represents the
first dissent on the Supreme Court as to Wiat constitutes a
governmental or proprietary function, and may v^ell be indic
ative of some future decision.

It will be noticed, th;t the

case does not involve injury to a pupil.

It is quoted here

because of its obvious importance to school people.

Follow

ing is the dissenting opinion of Justice Erickson:
. . . . I dissent. As is indicated in the
quotation from Perkins v. Trask, 95 Ilont. 1,
23 Pac. (2d) 932, found in the majority opinion,
the reason for the rule exempting school districts
from tort liability is not generally agreed upon
by the authorities. The rule arose, of course,
from the old idea that the king could do no
wrong, and suit would not lie against the sov
ereign, The courts of this land have never agreed
on any single basis why, in the absence of statute,
recovery against the school district cannot be had
by reason of its tort. One state (California) has
entirely discarded the old rule. (See, also,
Kelly V. Board of Education, 191 App. Div. 251,
180 N. I. Supp. 796.) Most of the states, in
attempting to decrease the severity of the rule,
have adopted the governmental-proprietary test.
This test is an arbitrary one, but the general
trend of the decisions is to declare more and more
functions proprietary rather than governmental so
as to allow recovery. It is now generally agreed
that neither logic nor justice supports the general
rule which in this case denies recovery to the
person injured where she goes for entertainment to
a basket ball game sponsored by a school district,
while on the other hand for exactly the same injurv
under the same conditions she could recover if she
had gone to a theatre and had been there injured.
For a general discussion of the governmentalproprietarv test as applied to municipal corporations
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in the light of recent decisions, see the
article in 22yij>ginia Law Review, 910, and
also the article in $4 Harvard Law Review,
437.
This court has in its recent decisions
followed the trend of the majority of the courts
of this country by applying the governmentalproprietary test liberally so as to permit re
covery. The gist of the majority’s opinion in
this case is that the activity here in question
was so closely connected with the historically
recognized governmental function of the school
district that it partook of the same nature.
It seems to me that in the Jacoby case cited in
the majority opinion, (Jacoby v. Chouteau County,
112 Mont. 70, 112 Pac. (2d) 1068), and certainly
in the Johnson v. City of Billings case, 101
Mont. 4 6 2 , 54 Pac. (&a) 579» the activity out of
which the tort arose was as closely identified
with the governmental function, if not more so,
than the holding of the public contest which we
have in this case. I cannot reconcile the
decision in this case with the decisions of those
two cases, particularly the more recent one of
Jacoby v. Chouteau County, supra.
Rehearing denied November 26, 1943*

Implications to School Districts
The Montana cases cited in this chapter have borne
out the general rule that school districts, in their corpo
rate capacity, are not liable for their own negligence or
for the negligence of their employees.

They have inferred,

however, that while this general rule of immunity will apply
to cases involving a governmental function, it will not
apply if the school district, or the school board, engages
in a proprietary function.

Justice Erickson’s dissenting

opinion, quoted above, shows an increasing willingness on
the uart of ohe court to consider more functions as being
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proprietary in nature.
These cases have also inferred that a school board,
or a school board member, may be liable for negligent per
formance of a ministerial duty.

The implications of these

cases should demonstrate to school board members in this
state that while the general rule of immunity is upheld in
Montana, and has been upheld in every one of these cases,
the opinions are in many instances not favored by the courts
as being entirely just, and that the doctrine of immunity
generally rests upon the court's willingness to follow pre
cedent in an effort to let the legislature assume responsi
bility for enacting remedial legislation.
There has been no legislative action forthcoming on
this subject.

However, the trend in legislation in some

other states has been to allow suits against the district to
a limited extent; these statutory exceptions are discussed
in more detail in Chapter V.

One may well wonder what the

effect might be if injured parties, instead of seeking re
covery through the courts, were to attempt in any great num
ber to bring their influence to bear upon the legislature in
the form of requests for private bills.

Certainly the legis

lature is morally obligated to pass these bills, and the
court, if it were to follow precedent, would be obligated to
declare these bills constitutional because of the decision in
Mills

V.

Stewart.
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Implications for Teachers,
Administrators and
Employees
The absence of any litigation involving teachers for
pupil injury in this state is probably explainable on the
ground that due to the average school teacher's income sat
isfaction of any judgment might be difficult.

Montana

Courts, however, have stated rather clearly in Mills v.
Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332, if the plaintiff's in
juries were the result of negligence on the part of the per
son responsible for the care and management of the dormitory
building, the plaintiff would have a valid legal claim which
he might enforce in an action at law.
This line of reasoning would seem to be quite ap
plicable to any case which might arise involving the neg
ligence of a school administrator, or teacher in charge of
a dormitory, or a janitor in charge of school buildings.
In view of the fact that teachers' salaries, and
school employees' salaries in general have been increasing,
and in view of the fact that the Montana court to date has
not allowed satisfaction against the district, (unless re
medial legislation is passed by the state legislature) school
people might reasonably expect to be sued more frequently
in the future than in the past.

The question arises as to

what is expected of a teacher or administrator by way of
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supervision.

The Perkins v. Trask case was not against a

board, so the question was never clearly decided as to wheth
er failure to supervise a swimming pool constituted negli
gence on the part of a teacher, however, the wording of the
court infers that it did.

The Montana court would undoubted

ly have to look to other jurisdictions.
It is obvious, however, that a duty exists to provide
some sort of supervision over pupils in school or on the
playground^.
The most frequently occurring type of case concerns
accidents which have happened in the course of physical
training activities.
A football coach, for example, is protected to some
extent from injuries that might happen to one of his players
in the course of a game by virtue of the fact that there is
an assumption of risk there, also by virtue of the fact that
it is customary in this state for schools to require pupils
engaged in competitive athletics to take out insurance on
their own behalf.

The implications of the common law, how

ever are quite clear that this assumption of risk does not
apply to activities engaged in in a regular physical educa
tion class or "gym period".
The case of the New York teacher who allowed the boys
to box, mthout warning or instruction, stands as a warning
to physical education instructors.

As a general rule an

ll60 A.L.R. 127 -196 .
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instructor in physical education may be liable if he requires
the performance of any activity on the part of a pupil which
results in an injury to that pupil, if the injury was a forseeable result of the activity.

In brief, he has no right

to require the performance of a task which is beyond the ob
vious physical capacity of the pupil.
As to the liability of administrators for physical
education facilities, it may be generally stated that many
states hold them responsible for the inspection of such fa
cilities, to the extent that no obviously dangerous condi
tions exist,

Rosenfield^ cites a case which may be of par

ticular interest to over-zealous football coaches.

The case

concerned a football coach >ho knowingly sent an injured
player back into the game.

He was declared negligent for

doing so and held liable, and moreover, the court declared,
that if he did not know of the injury, he was negligent be
cause of his ignorance of it.
The next area in which there appears to be a con
siderable amount of litigation concerning pupil injury is
that of transportation.

School bus drivers in the State of

ilontana are required by law to be bonded, if they are under
an individual contract with the school district.

Districts

operating their own busses are required to carry personal
liability insurance on the driver of between ten and fifteen
2

thousand dollars .
iRosenfield, 0£. cit.. II, 13, p. 64.
^School Laws of Montana, Chapt. 152, Sec. 6.
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There have been a number of cases in other juris
dictions brought against school bus drivers.

The general

conclusions drawn from these cases are that a bus driver's
duty of care towards the children on his bus does not end
vdien the student steps away from the bus, particularly if
the students have to cross a highway in front of the bus or
behind the bus.

Failure on the part of the bus driver to

warn small children of the danger, has been held to be suffi
cient cause to hold a bus driver liable for negligence^.
Another type of activity which is worth considering,
particularly since the activity type of curriculum is gain
ing in popularity, is that of the duty and liability imposed
upon teachers and administrators in the course of undertaking
field trips or excursions with students,
Madaline Remralein^ points out in her article that in
the course of visiting industrial plants, students have been
declared to be mere licensees, and must accept the premises
as they find them.

There appears to be no duty on the part

of the owner to make the plant or premises safe.

She also

points out that while no cases have been brought against
teachers to date (1941), the courts have said it was the
teacher's responsibility for taking pupils to a dangerous
place,

^Rosenfield, o^, cit,, II, 13, p. 77,
^Hadaline Remmlein, "Excursions are Often Hazardous",
Ration's Schools, XXVII (may, 1941), 55.
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Another situation which frequently arises in the
public schools, is that instance in which a teacher finds
himself or herself in the predicament of having to render
first aid, and is under an obligation to do so.

This does

not mean that a teacher has the authority to exercise med
ical judgment in the treatment of injuries or disease,
except in the case of emergency.

It is somewhat alarming to

note also, that if in the case of an emergency the teacher
fails to do anything, she may be liable criminally as well
as civilly.
An example of the limitations on first aid treatment
are illustrated by the case of the teacher who was held
liable vdien she put a boy's infected hand in a pan of scald
ing water for ten minutes, the results of which should be
obvious^.

Summary
In summary, it is found that the Ilontana courts have
adopted the traditional common law conception of school
immunity, and that they are more and more inclined to rest
this doctrine upon the grounds of governmental versus pro
prietary functions.

They conclude, with one dissenting

opinion in the latest case, that a school district is not
liable for its ovm negligence or the negligence of its em
ployees.
^"Accidents to Pupils, National Education Association
Research Bulletin, XXV (1940), 32»
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Aithough there have been no cases brought against
board members as individuals in this state, the general
weight of authority is that they may be liable as individuals
the same as any teacher or administrator, but that the occa
sion for

a board member to be acting in such a capacity in

respect to pupils would be rare.
Teachers, administrators and other employees of
school districts are regarded in the same general category
as other individuals, but may enjoy certain limited privi
leges in

respect to disciplinary measures.

It may be added,

that the

courts, as a matter of public policy, are sometimes

reluctant to declare a teacher negligent because of the very
nature of educational work, which entails a heavy obligation
to expose oneself to situations fraught with possibilities
for injuries to small children.
There is nothing in the dicta of the Montana cases,
however, to reassure teachers that the Montana court would
view a teacher's negligence or an administrator's negligence
in failing to provide inspection or supervision as being
unique or an exception to the general rules of tort liability.
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CHAPTER V
COMPARISON OF THE MONTANA POSITION
REGARDING LIABILITY AITH
OTHER STATES
It has already been stated that the majority of the
states of the union have followed the common law rule in re
gards to tort immunity.

Only seven states have enacted any

form of legislation to change the common law regarding tort
immunity^.

These states are:

California, Washington, Oregon,

Minnesota, New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.
The California law expressly permits suits against
the district for the negligence of the officers or employees^.
In the State of Washington, immunity from suit has
been voided by a law.

The permission is limited, however,

in that the statute expressly forbids suits based on in
juries connected with parks, playgrounds, field houses,
athletic apparatus or appliances, or manual training equip
ment^ .

^National Education Research Bulletin, o£. cit., IV,
54, a AV (1943).
^California School Code, 0£. cit., III, 26.
^Redfield v. School District, 92 Pac. 770 (1907).
-
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Minnesota passed a law in 1873 which was supposed to
allow suits against school districts for the negligence of
their employees; however, a subsequent decision of a Minnesota
court held that the statute applied only to damages to prop
erty caused by a breach of duty by school officers, and did
not change the rule of immunity^.
Oregon has had a similar experience to that of
Minnesota, in having the teeth taken out of the law by judi
cial interpretation^.
The next interesting type of statute which has been
effective in reducing the harshness of the governmental
immunity rule has been the so called save harmless statutes
found in Connecticut, New York and New Jersey^.
In this type of statutory provision, the law states
that school funds may and will be used to reimburse teach
ers v^o are sued because of their negligence in the course
of their duties.

New York has qualified its statute to the

extent that it "saves harmless" from liability teachers and
administrators only in districts of less than one million
population, and in larger districts it apparently protects
all employees.

^3ank v. Brainer School District 51, 51 N .. 814

(1892).
^Antin vs. Union High School District No. 2, 280 Pac.

664, (1929).
^Cumulative Supplement to Connecticut Statues, 234h-

New York Education Law, Sec. 569a.
New Jersey Statutes Annotated. Sec. 18:5-50.2.
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Frequently in the school laws of various states are
found provisions that require the drivers of school busses
to carry liability insurance, or if the bus is under contract,
liability insurance must be carried by the district.

Montana

has such a provision in its school laws^.
Another method frequently employed by socially minded
school districts throughout the United States has been the
taking out of liability insurance to protect the district in
case of pupil injury.

The legality of this insurance has

been questioned in many states, and has been rejected by the
2
courts of West Virginia and North Carolina . The Montana
Attorney General, Arnold H. Olsen, rendered an opinion in 1951
on this subject to the effect that;

"School district boards

of trustees have no authority to expend school district funds
to contract for liability insurance"^.
There is some valid criticism of this method for, if
the common law doctrine of immunity were applied, it would
be very easy for an insurance company to claim that there is
no need for it to pay since no liability exists in the eyes
of the law.
Many insurance policies of this nature have had the

ISchool Laws of Montana, 1949, Chap. 152, Sec. 6.
^Rosenfield, 0£. cit., p. 124.
o
Montana Attorney General* s Soinions, aAIV (October
19, 1951 ), Opinion No. 43.
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specific clause written in them that the insurance company
will not raise governmental immunity as a defense.
The overall picture of school district liability may
be summed up by saying that the only states which have at
present conceded, by legislation or judicial interpretation,
the changing of the common law doctrine, have been California
and Washington.

In the remaining forty-six states, the common

law doctrine still applies, but the severity of it has been
lessened in Connecticut, New York and New Jersey.

Minnesota

and Oregon have attempted by legislation to change this rule,
but subsequent judicial interpretations have practically
nullified the effect of their laws.

As it stands at the

present time, California is the only state where governmental
immunity has been removed to the extent that a pupil or his
parents may recover from the school district with the same
ease they could recover from a private corporation.
New York has accomplished this by the "save harmless"
statute, but has not actually declared that the common law
rule does not exist.
One thing may be noted with respect to the Montana
judicial decisions concerning this subject, Montana decisions
have been consistent, and they have relied, along with the
majority of states, on the common law rule.

They have de

clared that the statute to sue and be sued does not affect a
school district, and would probably decide that the provision
in the school law requiring bus drivers for school districts
to carry liability insurance would not in any v/ay be admissive
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of liability on the part of Montana school districts.
The general trend throughout the United States has
been to lessen the severity of the common law rule.

This has

been done by a variety of methods, most of which have been
discussed in this chapter.

One of the methods has been the

use of specific statutory provisions that school districts
are liable. Another method discussed, has been the so called
save harmless statutes. Another method not discussed here,
because of its use in the State of Washington, has been
practically nullified by subsequent decisions of the
Washington court, are the safe place statutes. Along with
this general trend, it should be noted that the Federal
Government itself has now consented by statute to allow it
self to be sued in tort^.
With reference to teachers and employees, the sit
uation is universally similar, the only exception being the
2

brief Iowa experiment .
It should be added, that Washington, Mew York and
California, during the last ten years, have all had an ex
ceedingly large amount of litigation concerning injuries to
pupils.

In view of the fact that these are heavily popu

lated states, it is difficult to make inferences from the
number of cases found; however, one might conjecture that it
is possible these states, in their effort to provide a just
remedy to the public, have subjected themselves to a
^Federal Tort Claims Act, 1943.
^Supra, p. 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-65-

tremexidous expense in having to provide funds to satisfy
judgments and damage suits, or reimburse teachers who are
sued.
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CHAPTER VI
SUM-ÎARY AND CONCLUSION
The problem has been defined as that of ascertaining
the status of liability on the part of Montana school dis
tricts and employees for the injury of pupils.

It can be

said that Montana is a typical state in its legal decisions
on this matter.

For many years, the courts of various states

have voiced their disapproval of the common law doctrine of
district immunity.

Regardless of wording, however, few courts

have ever taken it upon themselves to change the common law
by judicial interpretation.
Some judges have reasoned that since the common law
"grew up" in the courts, and was evolved by the judicial
branch, it is not only the perogative but the obligation of
the courts to change the law.
Regardless of the dicta of cases, however, the courts
in general have steadfastly adhered to the doctrine of immu
nity.
In two states, they went so far with their decisions
as to practically nullify the effect of a statute which was
probably intended to abrogate the old common law rule.
The problem of school district immunity has been dis
cussed at great length in comparison to the time devoted to
-
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employee liability, because the ability to reimburse an in
jured pupil or his parents must generally come from a larger
bank account than is possessed by most public school employees.
Strong legal and moral arguments may be presented for
upholding this doctrine of immunity from suit.

First of all,

as a matter of sound public policy, it might be considered
better to hold those liable whose negligence was personally
the cause of an injury.

Secondly, is it a justifiable expen

diture of public funds or taxpayers’ money to reimburse one
particular member of that public?

Thirdly, would the abro

gation of this rule bring a multitude of so called "smart
money” suits against the public treasury?
The arguments against holding the district immune
from suit for the torts of its agents are both academic and
practical.

On the academic side, it may be said that any

line of legal reasoning which has as its basis a phraeseology (the king can do no wrong) reminiscent of the divine
right of kings, has no place in a republican form of govern
ment which has dedicated itself to democratic philosophies.
It could be further argued, that if the federal government
now allows itself to be sued, by what moral or logical rea
son does the state government continue to hide behind its
immunity.
The law has drawn a fine distinction between those
obligations arising out of the law of contracts and those
arising from injury to the person or property.

It is dif

ficult to understand or appreciate the social worth of a
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reasoning process which says in effect that the rights of
businessmen shall be held sacred, but the rights of a small
child, if he is injured in the course of attending a public
school, (which the government insists he attend for the better
part of his childhood) are held to be subject and limited by
a rule which evolved long before the funds of a state were
ever considered public funds.
It has been pointed out that a great many cases have
been brought against school districts, teachers, administrators,
and school employees in the last few years.

In those states

where the school district is liable for its own torts and the
torts of its agents, it has caused, without a doubt, a size
able expenditure of public funds.
There are several aspects of the situation which can
not be measured in financial terras.
is the matter of public relations,

Of primary consideration,
A lawsuit brought against

the district or a teacher is probably one of the most detri
mental occurrences which can befall a school system or an
individual associating with tnat system.

If the school dis

trict hides behind its immunity, it leaves the teacher to
pay, if the teacher cannot pay and no judgment can be obtained,
hard feelings arise on the part of the injured party or his
parents.

On the other hand, if either the school district or

one of its teachers are found negligent by a court and held
liable for negligence, such publicity may be used by those
in any community, who wish to see a change in school adminis
tration or the board, as an affidavit testifying to the "poor
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job” the school is supposedly doing.
When these two factors, financial cost and detri
mental publicity, are coupled with the moral issue, that of
the right of a young child or its parents to be reimbursed
for injuries suffered due to the negligence of someone else,
the primary consideration as it pertains to school people
should be, "How can we best avoid those situations which
could lead not to liability necessarily, but injury or harm
to the pupil?"
Progressive educators are advocating more and more
the "experience curriculum".

If this philosophy of educa

tional method continues or grows in popularity, by its very
nature, it will expose students of all ages to out-of-class
activities, activities which by their very nature would
expose a person to a greater risk of harm than the heretofore
prosaic life associated with the traditional classroom.
This work has not attempted to list specific situa
tions in which a school board member or employee is or is
not liable for negligence.

No two situations are probably

exactly alike, and it is frequently a matter for the jury,
rather than the law to decide whether a person or a corpora
tion acted in a negligent manner.

It has attempted to render

a general background in the field as to the reasoning engaged
in by courts of law in applying the law of torts to school
districts and their employees.
A school board member in ilontana should be aware
that while he is generally immune from suit, as a member of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-70that body, for the negligence of the administrator or teacher,
it is extremely bad politics to have a suit brought against
a board.

Secondly, that this immunity applies only if the

activity engaged in by the school board is of a governmental
nature.

It does not apply if the activity being engaged in

is of a proprietary nature, or one in ^hich the board itself
would realize a profit or gain.

One further word of caution

should be noted, in that this rule of immunity does not,
nor has it ever, applied to a member of a school board acting
as an individual and not as a corporate member of that board.
To administrators, the problem has its political con
notations similar to those of a board member.

In addition

to this, courts and juries have consistently supported the
view that a duty to supervise and correct known dangerous
conditions is an obligation inherent to the position.
To teachers, a study of this type should indicate
that regardless of phrases such as "district immunity", no
such immunity applies to them, and that to avoid situations
in which they may become liable, they must utilize, in the
course of their daily work, a great deal of common sense
tempered by the knowledge that the law and the public expect
prudent behavior commensurate with their position.
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